By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization
The Pentagon’s China reports refer to it as a “fait accompli,” ….. a sudden, massive, catastrophic Chinese ballistic missile attack on Taiwan designed to overwhelm its air defenses, destroy its aircraft and quickly encircle or occupy the island with an amphibious assault.
The potential Chinese thinking, according to Pentagon strategists tracking the Chinese threat, would be to annex Taiwan quickly such that it would become too costly in terms of casualties, war damage and dollars to assemble a force capable of “extricating” an occupying Chinese force from Taiwan.
Looking at available force numbers across the Pacific from countries such as South Korea and Japan, and the number of available 5th-generation aircraft and US Navy assets, it does seem realistic that a US allied force might be able to “remove” or destroy PLA forces occupying Taiwan, yet the question is “at what cost?” Including reserves, Globalfirepower.com’s 2023 force assessments says Japan can mass as many as 1 million forces and South Korea has at least 2 million in manpower. However, what would it take to assemble, stage and launch a multi-national amphibious attack force capable of removing a Chinese force embedded in Taiwan? Getting heavy armor or mechanized formations to the island of Taiwan would also likely prove quite difficult or time consuming. Naval superiority and 5th-generation air attack, coupled with long-range surface and air land strike would seem critical to any effort of this kind. Air superiority would likely be the fastest and most expedient path through which to destroy a Chinese force occupying Taiwan.
Ultimately, the operative question is …. would China take a chance on the possibility that the US and its allies would simply let a “fait accompli” Chinese takeover of Taiwan stand?
This is a complicated question with a number of military and political variables, yet somewhat less complicated yet equally if not more dangerous is the threat of a high-speed, unexpected Chinese ballistic missile takeover of Taiwan. Although Taiwan is only 100 miles from the Chinese mainland, any kind of assembling or preparing amphibious attack force would be noticed by US and allied drones and satellites, offering a brief window through which to respond. Should there be sufficient stealthy, heavily armed attack submarines and forward-positioned US Navy 5th-generation sea launched aircraft, then a Chinese amphibious attack could very well be destroyed from the air and undersea before reaching Taiwanese shores.
However, an unexpected, rapid, massive salvo of ballistic missiles would be an entirely different scenario, especially if hypersonics were involved. Being just 100 miles away from Taiwan, Chinese mainland forces could launch a massive, high-speed ballistic missile attack with the hope of crippling Taiwan faster than any defenders could respond. Even if launches were detected by US and allied satellites and sensors, would there be enough interceptors and missile defenses in place and capable of blunting, slowing or stopping a massive salvo of Chinese missiles targeted at Taiwan’s air defenses, land forces and air assets. Obviously any kind of credible early intelligence would be critical here, because any ability to stop a Chinese “salvo” would rely on how soon or quickly US and allied defenders would know about it.
A cutting edge research effort by Rand and the Special Competitive Studies Project took up this question of defending Taiwan in an elaborate, next-generation wargame aimed at assessing a US, Taiwanese or allied effort to stop a rapid Chinese take-over of Taiwan. Interestingly, RAND military experts worked in close coordination with private sector IT and silicon valley technologists to explore solutions to a potential Chinese invasion. The wargame assessment, as articulated in an essay from the report’s authors in Breaking Defense, did indeed reveal the serious difficulties which would be associated with any effort to stop a massive ballistic missile attack.
The game’s findings discovered that the use of large numbers of fake drones, cloud computing, commercial surveillance technology such as smartphone apps, decoys and swarming groups of coordinated smart “sea mines” could massively reduce China’s chances for success. The wargame experts referred to some of this as “Multi-Domain Drone Mimics,” explaining that a large-scale deployment of decoys or phony air and surface drones would “confuse” Chinese targeting systems, making it harder for PLA forces to hit high-value targets. This, the studies authors suggest, could create the perception of a larger coalition force than might actually exist and obscure critically important targets from Chinese sensors and weapons. The wargames findings also, not surprisingly, heavily emphasized “networking” technologies and secure applications of cloud technology enabling rapid, multi-node access to target specifics and war intelligence.
However, ….The RAND wargamers found that without applying some of these perhaps lesser recognized innovations in the wargame, the US lost more than 100 5th generation fighter aircraft, “mostly on the ground, due to missile strikes.” Assuming Taiwan still would not have the F-35, the wargamers may have figured that the US 5th-gen losses would likely come from Japan, South Korea or F-35s traveling on the decks of US Navy amphibs and carriers.
When using some of the cutting edge solutions, the game estimated 50-percent fewer aircraft losses and Chinese amphibious forces losses massively increased as well, according to reports authors. (Jim Mitre, RAND & Ylber Bajraktari, Special Competitive Studies Project)
It seemed quite significant that the RAND wargame found large numbers of fighter jet losses “on the ground,” meaning before they could take off for any kind of counter-attack. This underscores the dangers associated with a rapid, large-scale Chinese ballistic missile attack, something China’s missile modernization efforts only seem to complicate.
Forward Presence & Deterrence to Stop China
Given this threat scenario, the question then becomes one of forward presence, and the pace and volume with which any kind of large-scale Chinese ballistic missile “bolt out of the blue” could be countered. Even if sufficient US Navy SM-3-armed destroyers and cruisers were in sufficient proximity to track and intercept ballistic missiles heading to Taiwan, would they exist in sufficient numbers to counter a 100-missile strong Chinese attack? Given how close China is to Taiwan, could enough US Navy interceptor weapons be in position to defend Taiwan? Japan is an Aegis radar ally able to network with US ships and track ballistic missile threats, yet there could simply be too many Chinese missiles to stop, leaving Taiwan’s air defenses, weapons and air assets on the ground extremely vulnerable to being overwhelmed. Even if satellites detected the simultaneous launch of large numbers of Chinese ballistic missiles, could the attack be stopped or at least rendered ineffective? Would seem unlikely. A ballistic missile attack would likely be a sheer question of volume, meaning that regardless of how effective or precise any kind of air defenses or interceptor missiles might be … there simply would not be enough to stop Taiwan from being overwhelmed.
The only hope then, might simply be deterrence and the potential to ensure a rapid, crippling, major US and allied military response to any Chinese attack, one reason why the US Navy maintains a steady forward presence in the Pacific. This kind of threat scenario is likely why t
he Pentagon makes a point to emphasize its forward readiness and ability to counter China in the region. Also, even if Taiwan’s defenses were obliterated and China might seem to have a quick and easy path to occupy the island … their forces would still need to get there. Although the Chinese Navy grabs headlines for its sheer size and growing fleet of carriers and destroyers, the PLA is still operating at a sufficient deficit when it comes to 5th-generation air power when compared with the US Navy. A Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan without air superiority is likely to be extremely vulnerable to forward-positioned US Navy amphib-and-carrier-launched F-35Bs and F-35Cs. Should enough US and allied 5th-generation assets be within striking distance of an approaching Chinese amphibious take over, they would likely be well positioned to simply annihilate Chinese ships, helicopters and amphibious vessels heading for Taiwan. As part of this equation, one must also consider that Singapore, South Korea and Japan are all F-35 countries with aircraft possibly within response range to defend Taiwan.
China’s Ballistic Missiles
The rapid growth of China’s arsenal of ballistic missiles only makes this possibility more realistic and ominous. The People’s Liberation Army’s ballistic missile stockpile has been growing at an explosive pace, as closely cataloged by the Pentagon’s annual China reports. The 2021 Pentagon report on China’s military capabilities, for example, explains some of the metrics and scope of China’s ballistic missile arsenal expansion.
A quick look at China’s growing missile arsenal highlights the fast-growing threat to Taiwan.
“In 2020, the PLARF launched more than 250 ballistic missiles for testing and training,” according to the 2021 Pentagon report, titled Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China. “This was more than the rest of the world combined.”
China’s “carrier-killer” Dong-Feng 21D (DF-21D) and Dong-Feng 26 (DF-26) have been on the Defense Department’s radar for many years. The PLARF’s growing inventory of DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles are now capable of “conducting both conventional and nuclear strikes against ground targets as well as conventional strikes against naval targets,” according to the report. China is known to test these missiles and adjust them so that they are better able to track and destroy moving targets at sea. China’s ability to hit moving targets at sea, such as carrier aircraft, has been somewhat questionable. However, the technology required to perform thi will quickly improve.
“In 2020, the PRC fired anti-ship ballistic missiles against a moving target in the South China Sea, but has not acknowledged doing so,” the report states.
The Pentagon report notes that China’s DF-21D poses a growing risk. Its range exceeds 1,500 kilometers and it uses a reentry vehicle that “is reportedly capable of rapidly reloading in the field,” the report states.
China’s missile modernization efforts are immersed in developing newly designed “theater range missiles” and exploring new technologies intended to challenge or defeat ballistic missile defenses (BMD). Countering BMD might require exploration into the realm of course-correcting maneuvering missiles and further developing sea-skimming weapons that can glide beneath the radar field of view.
China’s growing missile arsenal continues to spark concerns. Its efforts to harness new missile innovations for new programs are equally concerning. These technological enhancements could put China in a position to overwhelm, jam or disable air defense in Guam, Japan or Taiwan. An attack by the PRC could include firing missiles or using new targeting guidance, seekers and datalinks capable of adjusting missile trajectory as needed.
Long-range Chinese ballistic missiles such as the hypersonic DF-27 can reportedly reach ranges of 8,000km, a distance that places them well within reach of hitting Taiwan from mainland China. However, how many DF-27s does China have on hand? What kind of guidance systems do they operate with and how precise is their targeting technology?
A report from May 2023 in the South China Morning Post says the hypersonic DF-27 has been in existence for several years, however, the size of its arsenal seems unknown. Clearly, a long-range hypersonic threat such as the DF-27 presents serious challenges for Taiwan, even though the number of DF-27s in China’s arsenal coupled with Beijing’s targeting ability and guidance technology seem unknown.
Kris Osborn is the President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia Universityglo
