by Mark Episkopos, Managing Editor, Center for Military Modernization
Eighteen months into the Ukraine-Russia War, Russian troops still have not achieved air superiority as the term is defined by the U.S. Air Force. That is, Russian troops have not secured a degree of control over Ukrainian skies sufficient to permit them to conduct operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air and missile threats. The underlying reasons for Russia’s inability to freely operate in Ukrainian airspace cannot be unpacked without studying Russian failures in the war’s opening act, a complex topic that deserves its own write-up. Suffice it to say, the Kremlin invasion was drawn up according to a series of political assumptions about Ukraine’s will and ability to fight that did not reflect the facts on the ground.
The invading Russian forces faced much stiffer-than-expected Ukrainian resistance. Russia’s aircraft losses were not nearly as steep as its ground forces, with the British Royal Air Force counting a modest eighty-six fixed-wing aircraft and ninety helicopters destroyed since the war began, precisely because Russia’s military leadership conceded early on that their aircraft cannot freely operate in much of Ukrainian airspace and were forced to adjust their operations accordingly. The Russian Aerospace Forces’ (VKS) reluctance to run extensive operations involving tactical aircraft hampered the invasion in its crucial early stages, forcing the Russians to instead rely on standoff munitions launched from friendly territory. Ukrainian forces have leveraged their broad selection of western-provided air defense systems, from U.S. Patriot batteries to German IRIS-T systems as well as older HAWK launchers and various man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), to impose costs on and ultimately restrict the VKS’ ability to support Russian ground forces.
But it’s not all good news for Ukrainian troops. Despite being forced to operate in a reduced capacity, the VKS has exploited its overwhelming advantage in standoff firepower to saturate targets across Ukraine with missiles launched outside of Ukrainian territory. Russian forces have tried to compensate for their inability to freely conduct air operations in Ukrainian skies with relentless drone strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure, potentially forcing Kyiv to expend scarce surface-to-air missiles on Iranian-provided Shahed-136’s and other drones that are much more plentiful and less expensive.
Though Russia is unlikely to achieve anything approaching unfettered dominance in Ukrainian airspace for the foreseeable future, Russian troops have secured what defense researcher Justin Bronk described as “a measure of localised superiority” in parts of eastern-southeastern Ukraine. More importantly in light of Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive, Russia has denied Ukrainian forces control over stretches of airspace in the southern regions where they are currently attacking. This disadvantage has rendered Ukrainian troops vulnerable to Russian helicopters and drones working in tandem with artillery strikes to hinder Ukrainian advances. The focus at this stage in the war is no longer on which side has air superiority. Instead, both Russia and Ukraine are more concerned with preventing each other from establishing and expanding pockets of localized air superiority across the line of contact.
BY MARK EPISKOPOS, MANAGING EDITOR, CENTER FOR MILITARY MODERNIZATION
Mark Episkopos is the new Managing Editor of the Center for Military Modernization. Episkopos is a journalist, researcher, and analyst writing on national security and international relations issues. He is also a Ph.D. candidate in history at American University.
