Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization
Center for Military Modernization Talks to Peter Huessy, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, about the current dangers of nuclear war with both Russia and China
Kris Osborn
Hello and welcome. I’m Kris Osborn at the Center for Military Modernization. Very glad you’re here, unfortunately serious topic today very dangerous times talking about nuclear weapons. And we have here to discuss one of the leading experts in nuclear weapons in the country, Professor Peter Huessy. And he is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and is a very serious expert on strategic deterrence policy. Thank you so much, Mr. Huessy. Glad you’re here. Professor.
Peter Huessy
Thank you very much, Chris. Honored to be talking to you today.
Kris Osborn
Well gosh, there’s so much ground to cover and obviously so much of the threat equation. What about former STRATCOM Commander Admiral Richard talked about how satellite photos and we’ve all seen the pictures Google Earth will show them of silos being built on mainland China and the pace just in terms of sheer warheads and numbers of Chinese nuclear modernization as talked about in the Pentagon reports is staggering.
Peter Huessy
Admiral Richard called it breathtaking. And what the Chinese have done is build upwards of 360 silos now, what are they going to put in the silos are two options, the DF 31 and DF 41. It will be a three warhead or up to 10 warheads a missile. And if you do the math, a maximum would be about 3600. I think the Pentagon basically thinks somewhere in between zero and that number. So they’re projecting that by the year 2035. China will have at least 1500 warheads deployed on nuclear strategic long range nuclear warheads, as opposed to the 400 people assume they have today. I think the number is going to be higher than 1500 because the Chinese don’t have a transparent system. They don’t tell us what they have. We can use technical means or satellites to determine how many submarines and how many bombers they have, but in terms of warhead production, the Russians are building very big plutonium production plant for them, where they’ll be able to build a lot more warheads, then. Some critics have assumed China has a small arsenal because they cannot produce a lot of weapons grade material. That’s apparently changed completely.
Kris Osborn
Well, that’s an important point. You know, with an expert like you and some of the experts who pay attention to our content, they can handle the details. So want to ask you about a couple of specific weapons programs. I read just today I was looking over some past stuff at the CSS 10 Mod 2 is a nuclear ICBM as well, as some of you mentioned the DF 41 The Chinese have about three nuclear missiles ICBMs that can reach the mainland us from mainland China. You just look at the map those missiles go 12,000 kilometers while you’re looking at LA and Beijing. They’re 10,000 kilometers away. So there’s a serious threat there, especially if the numbers keep multiplying.
Peter Huessy
Well, it’s more interesting than that even. A number of people looked at the ICBMs the Chinese were building that were on rail cars that were hiding or sheltering in the mountains, hiding on railroad tracks, if you remember, and they then looked at the launch areas from where the missile would be launched. And they knew how long these missiles can go. And they did a tape measure over the North Pole and said holy cow Do you know where they land? Cheyenne, Wyoming, Malstrom
In Montana and Minot in North Dakota. Exactly in those three areas are our three ICBM bases. And Dr. Phil Carver when he did the analysis said they’re building a first strike pre emptive capability to be able to take out our ICBMs forces. So they’re not in the minimal deterrence business. They’re not just going to blow up cities. In fact, they’re going after our nuclear capability. Thank God we got submarines at sea, then we put can put bombers in the air in a crisis and at some point we might make some of our ICBMs mobile. I’m I don’t think it’s necessary right now. But the Chinese are going from, oh, we’re going to hold Los Angeles at risk. And maybe New York and maybe Chicago, and we’ll call it minimal deterrent, and will only go second will never go first. They’ve completely changed it even if you believe the previous rhetoric, which I don’t. They completely gone the opposite direction. And they’re building a first class, peer competitor nuclear offensive nuclear arsenal.
Kris Osborn
I was looking over some quotes and as far back as 2021, former commander of Global Strike Command General Ray said that according to Pentagon reports, and estimates the Chinese number of nuclear weapons will essentially double within a decade. And so that speaks specifically to your concern what you just mentioned about a potential bolt out of the blue, massive salvo kind of attack to kind of cripple our own ICBMs thus it reinforcing the importance of the triad. So my question to you is, what about multiple reentry vehicles? And you mentioned launchers. There was a congressional report on China’s military as far back as 2014 and talked about multiple reentry vehicles. What are some of your concerns about those kinds of threats? As you see the numbers proliferate?
Peter Huessy
Well, I’m worried about is that the Chinese use their nuclear forces for blackmail and coercion. They’re not interested in seeing Shanghai wiped off the map, just because they can wipe New York off the map.
But what they intend to do with these reentry vehicles, getting into the 1000s, is to say, we’re going to hold you at risk sufficiently that you will be intimidated, and therefore when we go after Taiwan, or after South Korea or Japan, you will not come to the defense of your friends and your allies.
The USA has an extended nuclear deterrent over Europe and the Asia. But we don’t have any theater nuclear systems in Asia. We withdrew them all back to 1981 when President Bush withdrew our nuclear forces from the peninsula from South Korea. He did so because the North Korean said if you do that will allow you to inspect our nuclear facilities. Well, we did withdraw. There was minimal inspection of the nuclear facilities in North Korea. Then we got the Agreed Framework and Six Party Talks. And guess what? North Korea now as you can make your own guess has some 50 nuclear warheads. In fact, I had a seminar this morning with Dr. Uzi Rubin, who is the world’s premier expert on missile threats. And he said this is a quote from him. North Korea now can exceed the capability of in terms of technology of Russia, in terms of building some types of nuclear missiles. In fact, he talked about how they’re building a glide vehicle that can orbit come down halfway through the atmosphere and then dramatically launch warheads back to Earth which is, you know, something we don’t have the two tests we did of hypersonic vehicles like that we’ve cancelled after determining we couldn’t do that. So we have some very serious threats. China, as you know, seeks to intimidate us to get us to back down and not fight.
I’m not worried about New York being nuked. What I’m worried about is we get in a fight with China we can’t win, because we’ve neglected our forces now. We’re going forward the conventional and going forward with nuclear modernization. But Chris, as you know, we’re behind the eight ball. We’re not going to finish our nuclear stuff until about 2042 because we started late. And so the Chinese, they don’t sit around and have a great big 20 year pause because they think they want to show restraint which we did after the end of the Cold War.
Kris Osborn
Well, I want to pick up on something you said which is the balance between sustainment and of course modernization
and new platforms. I spoke not that long ago with the Sentinel developers, and they said this was on track. And sure enough, Andrew Hunter the Air Force acquisition executive said there won’t be a missile gap of some have been concerned about meaning a period of time in which the Minuteman is obsolete and no longer functional before enough Sentinels get here. Sounds like there might not be that gap.
Peter Huessy
It’s a very good question, and I was talking to a gentleman in the Air Force today about exactly that question and that is what folks are mostly working on. We’re retiring conventional forces quite rapidly. As you know, the number of Navy ships and the number of Air Force airplanes is remarkably going down. Right, as we’re modernizing why we want to save money from what are called legacy systems because they’re expensive. We take the same money, put it into new technology for the new platforms, like the new Air Force airplanes and the new Navy ships. The problem is we’re getting smaller at the same time, the bad guys are getting bigger. So did they think, Well, you know, we got the United States kind of at risk here. There’s a gap between they’re getting a little bit smaller, we’re getting bigger. Maybe we go now, rather than waiting until 2030 When the United States gets better now and in the nuclear business, we’re not going to wait. Now we are going to keep the number of submarines, bombers and ICBMs because we know the New START Treaty says you can have 700 deployed systems called SN DVS and translates to about 1800-1900 warheads if you fully loaded the bombers. So as long as we keep that pace, but the thing is, two thirds of the money is being spent to maintain and sustain the old stuff. And only a third is going into the new stuff.
You’re getting a bargain. You’re getting very efficient, very effective. But the old stuff, we don’t make a lot of this stuff anymore. So a lot of stuff we may find one day it’s not working We’re gonna being hard pressed to go out and especially manufacture the legacy platforms. I top
Of which we have supply chain issues and available workforce issues.
But let me say this about the industry. Industry since the end of the Cold War, will not begin fielding modernized platforms until roughly the end of this decade, and it was after 2006 when Bush and Obama were presidents when we decided to begin the research and development toward a modern Triad. And the overall force was agreed to finally in late 2010 when the entire force modernization was detailed in a classified annex in the defense bill.
We’ve kind of submitted it in an agreement with Congress. And since then, we are now on the 14th year of modernization and industry throughout that entire period since the end of the Cold War in 91 we are now what 30 odd years since then. They have maintained platforms that are going to be 40-60 years old. Would you give your daughter a 10 year old car to go to college? We’re giving the Air Force and Navy boys and girls saying your subs are 40 years old, your ICBMs are 55 years old. And by the way, the B 52 Bomber. I think the H model is going to be 70 years old, right at the end of the deal. So we basically took extraordinary systems and hats off to the industry, because most of these things when built were given a 10 year warranty. Okay, so MMIII now at 55 going to be 65 when we replace it, so the challenge is extraordinary.
But I tell you what industry is doing and also the services, the Air Force and the Navy. Their military folks have to make sure this all works. Because you can’t just immediately build new stuff and say oh, oops I just realized the old stiff doesn’t work!’ And you just cant get rid of it. It’s our current deterrent. So that is in my mind the biggest challenge we face simultaneously, keeping what you have so you deter building a new one so you better deter and simultaneously making bold mesh. That’s that’s quite a challenge. .
Kris Osborn
I want to ask you about pure numbers because you hear someone the hill talk about what we don’t really need the triad, maybe we don’t need the land leg. And then when you think in terms of bolts out of the blue, and should there be an ongoing salvo of incoming nuclear weapons you can’t really defend that reminds me of the philosophical paradox of strategic deterrence is that Counter Strike retaliatory assurance is really the only way to prevent an attack like that, right, which is reasons why they argue for a large number of weapons and then they all three legs of the triad.
Peter Huessy
Let me give you some easy numbers. Today if I’m a colonel in the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, and I get up in the morning, and I go see my Colonel General, head of the rocket forces say general I got a great idea today. We’re going to attack the Americans. We’re going to take out their submarines in port and their bombers on their airfields that aren’t on alert and 450 ICBMs and launch control centers. The general comes back and says Colonel, what do you do about the nearly 1000 warheads that we know will come back on us including some ICBMs, all the submarines at sea and bombers that they get an alert? That’s the answer. Paul Nitze used to say a great strategic thinker, and helped most administrations from Truman right up through Reagan. What did he say he wanted the Russians, gentlemen to conclude every morning. “Not today. Comrade.”
Now let’s say we the USA make a dumb decision and let’s get rid of the land base ICBMs all 400 of them. How many targets you got left? Three bomber bases. Two sub bases, and maybe six submarines at sea. I just did the math 11. You take out 11 targets none of which have to be taken out with a nuclear weapon. All the bomber fields snd the submarine based. They’re soft targets.
Now we’ve said the submarines at sea are enough and the bombers will hopefully get airborne in a crisis.
Thus if you get rid of ICBMs you’ve reduced your total inventory to 11 targets and it gets even worse.
With no ICBM and just subs and bombers you can only have a maximum 1536 missile warheads.. Well, that’s the number we’re already allowed under the New START Treaty (minus 16..)
We can’t build up a single additional warhead on a missile. That’s a fast flyer that can get to Russia and China in 30 minutes. So what do you do if there’s a breakout? You’re stuck you can’t build any more than you already have. Because you’ve gotten rid of the ICBM leg and your submarine can only have 16 missiles. And a maximum 8 warheads. That’s it? Yeah, multiply 16 x 12 submarines times eight warheads per missile. That’s your maximum. And so you basically have de you’ve disarmed yourself with any chance of growing and you’re stuck. And so getting rid of ICBMs is not only dumb from a targeting point of view, but dumb from needing a hedge. Every president signed an arms deal said I understand we’re limited but we got to have a hedge that’s called the useable stockpile in case we have to go back up. So Killing ICBMs that some in congress have wanted to do is really dumb. The idea was killed in the house over 3/1!
So remember killing ICBMs means we eliminate the hedge. We have no upload capability. And we’re basically putting a sign on our back saying come get me. I mean, talk about really, really dumb ideas!
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Kris Osborn
Yeah. Well, very cool. It was a cartoon from the 80s. I think it was Reagan and Gorbachev were both sitting in a pool of gasoline. And they each had three matches, not one. And so the idea was this question of numbers and redundancy and it speaks very much to the point you were just making, which is the need for a large number of ICBMs. And the land base part of the triad records what a navy developer wants to be the whole point of the Columbia class nuclear armed submarines is to say, don’t even think about it kind of like you were saying Not today. That there’s this clear message of deterrence, which is and that’s really what I want to kind of ask you i
s because there’s really a bottom line question. Here. It’s almost philosophical, because people will think nuclear weapons and how horrific they can be. Yet there’s a paradox or an irony fundamental to this, which is they’re designed to never be used. There’s this idea of keeping the peace…And the last thing I’ll say quickly is it reminds me of general Weinstein, who was in charge of the GBSD program several years ago, I talked to him and he put a philosopher on my radar Brody, who was a Yale guy that wrote years ago decades in World War Two era, about how the whole point is in this paradoxical that here’s this weapon and the intent was never use it. So the idea is peace. Unfortunately, it’s peace through strength in arms, and it sounds self evident. But that’s important to bear in mind and it’s something I know is right up your alley.
Peter Huessy
And Chris, it’s very important to understand, why do we have a variety of weapons, both theater and strategic, long range, short range? We want the bad guys to sit in a computer and go through every permutation they can about attacking us and come up with exactly the same answer every time. Comrade General this does not work. Okay. We ended up in worse shape than the those bad Americans. You can’t do that with just one size fit all. You can’t just say oh, can we just have submarines or let’s have bombers, or go to some minimal deterrent? Because, as you pointed out, deterrence is not in our eyes. It’s in their eyes. They must think they’re deterred.
No matter what we think we may think the use of 10 nuclear weapons would be a disaster, which it would be. Can you imagine waking up one morning and finding out in New York, Chicago, San Antonio, Portland, Washington, Seattle have been each hit with even one nuclear device. But you know what a nuclear device would do, like a 200 kiloton bomb, you’d kill 700,000 People in Manhattan in a matter of seconds, to say nothing of all the radiation poisoning. So deterrence is critical to maintain because unless it’s credible, and the bad guys think they can’t attack, you are risking conflict and war.
You don’t want them to ever say that today is the time to attack. Okay, that’s why you need a multiplicity of things because what if one technology goes bad? What if some system doesn’t? You want a little bit of redundancy, of course.
Now there’s another thing. People say well dont build nuclear weapons build conventional weapons. Right? Well, as you pointed out, Admiral Richard, but also Anthony Cotton, who’s replaced him and said the same thing. Whenever we do these war games, with conventional forces, we do okay, but not all the time. But if the bad guys introduce nuclear weapons into the conventional mix, or Putin calls escalate to win, when Russia threatens to use nuclear weapons to intimidate you to stand down because we don’t want you to win with your conventional forces. They both use the same phrase, nothing holds. And what I mean our conventional deterrent no longer is viable, is what they’re saying. It no longer can protect us.
If the bad guys introduce nuclear weapons, what does it tell you? Your nuclear deterrent has a gap, which you must close and that’s where the cruise missile for the Navy comes in, and where our nuclear modernization comes in, because we don’t just have an umbrella over Europe with our theater systems, which are fighter planes, gravity bombs. It’s the submarines the bombers and the ICBMs are extended. Deterrence is our strategic nuclear umbrella. They’re both critically important.
But Putin obviously sees a gap. And it’s been interesting in Ukraine is we said we will not use NATO forces because when we think we’ll go nuclear. The USA President said that, on the other hand, we’ll give them weapons from our inventory. And that will not force Mr. Putin to use nukes.
So there is a two way deterrent going on here. The question is, if you have a plan to win this war in Ukraine, and I’ve been told recently by some professionals, this is gonna go on for two more years, at a minimum, and the question is, wait a minute, what’s your plan to win? Well, we don’t want to antagonize Russia too much. Well, what are we in this war for? Just to muddle through and basically in another stalemate and end up with another Afghanistan.
Kris Osborn
Something I really want to ask you about, which is this escalate to win strategy and I know that’s up your alley as an expert, and has Hooton as Putin been holding the world hostage with this nuclear threat, essentially scaring people such an extent that they you just mentioned this, that it is potentially quite credible and realistic, or is there enough of a survival instinct that he’s not going to want to essentially eliminate himself by starting something like [a nuclear war]?
Peter Huessy
Well, Chris, he’s not telling. He has not sent out a letter saying Dear Mr. President, if you do this all in the world, but if you do that, then I won’t go crazy. So the question is, he’s kind of held people hostage, which how reckless you think he is? Now, I know, senators who will remain unnamed, Republican and Democrat, who think we should beat the Russians would be good to take them down a notch. And they don’t say Putin will use nuclear weapons. Right. On the other hand, I know House members from both parties who think if Russia is losing conventionally, particularly in the Donbass and particularly if they think they will lose the Navy base, he will use a small nuclear device in limited numbers in the Ukraine theater. You’re not going to nuke New York. But then the question is ask yourself, what happens next? Right. Do we back down because if we back down after he uses nuclear weapons, NATO is gone. Extended Deterrence has gone and not just in Europe. It goes away in the Middle East and it goes away in the Pacific. So are you ready, America to respond to how if Mr. Putin, God forbid, uses, let’s say, just one or two nuclear devices. Now, right. Some people have said, well, we’ll respond with conventional forces. Even if they come at us again, with a nuclear device in the theater, which means in Europe and not continental United States because they know they hit continental United States, all bets are off. So my question and concern is, if you think Mr. Putin is not reckless, okay, roll the dice, take them down, defeat them. Take back all of Ukraine. But we’re not. When you hear the underlining tone it is. We don’t want to push Russia too much. Because man, he’s crazy. He might use nuclear weapons and then there’s no script for that. Okay. So if that’s the case, while you didn’t believe he’s as reckless as he says he’s going to be right. And then the question is, okay, if conventional forces ain’t going to do the job, because we’re not going to be fully modernized until the 2030s and beyond, and you don’t have in the theater, nuclear weapons, except for gravity bombs on fighter planes, take time to get to the target after go through air defenses. So this is the dilemma we’re in and that’s what escalate to win came from, is Putin said you guys can’t match me. I’ve got 2000 to 4000 theater nuclear weapons. I can intimidate you to stand down. And if Putin thinks the USA is winning conventionally. he’ll threaten to go nuclear war.
Kris Osborn
Well, I’m glad you said that. He’s reminds me I remember hearing a discussion on the hill and former Secretary of Defense James Mattis was asked about lower yield. And you kind of touched on this tactical nuclear weapons. I want to ask you about lower yield. His point was not that they lower the threshold to nuclear war and this question of is there the possibility of a of a proportional response, but he said it was to bring Russia back to the negotiating table to give commanders a wider purview of deterrence options. That speaks to exactly what you were just saying, which is Russia’s ability to hold hostage or intimidate with this massive volume of tactical weapons. So what’s your thought on that?
Well, again, it comes back to Mr. Putin ain’t telling. Okay, so we’re guessing. Well, you can guess wrong and end up on the weak side, or we can avoid determining what Russian nukes weaken our conventional capability, which putin thinks he can overcome with nukes.
Or you can say, I want to stop every option he puts on the table. Right? And I got to do it credibly. That’s why the USA does military exercises. That’s why I work with France and work with the England that’s where I work with my other allies, Japan and South Korea in the Pacific. The reason we do these exercises, is we want to demonstrate visibly to the bad guys. You see what happens when you’re monkey around with us. Right? You are gonna lose.
Kris Osborn
You know one of the things that came to mind as you were talking is this cost we could talk for an hour about hypersonic nuclear weapons, which of course the Russians have threatened or demonstrated and we could talk another hour about missile defense, which I’m really interested in your thoughts on. But I want to make sure I don’t forget polo proliferation because this speaks very much to your expertise, where some other places because we think Russia China, of course, but there’s a ran you mentioned North Korea earlier. What’s your thought on proliferation right now, who else can get the two big ones in North Korean around?
Peter Huessy
But let’s explain why. In 1982, Deng Xiaoping said to the Politburo in a secret address, we’re going to proliferate nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Libya, and I believe, though it was unstated. I think Iraq got in the game.
Now Pakistan started in the 1970s developing a nuclear capability. But China gave additional help across the board. Now you know if in early 1991 we had not gotten into Desert Storm, Saddam would have gotten nuclear weapons. We know that. If the Navy and Italians the United States did not interdicted that supply ship, the BBC China with centrifuges onboard nuclear centrifuges bound for Libya. Libya might have had a nuclear weapons program.
We also know Pakistan got help from missiles from North Korea. They gave North Korea help with respect to nuclear weapons. We know North Korea has nuclear weapons some people think 20.
Some people didn’t 50 I think Pakistan has about 100 or their abouts. So we know China was successful proliferating in Pakistan and North Korea and almost in Libya and Iraq. But the wildcard still out is Iran. And for Iran goes nuclear which they have advanced nuclear technology. While report the other day said well, they’re not building a warhead in my mind is how do you know why it’s so small? You can hide it anywhere and given the amount of time we have had no with no inspections, how do we know?
And the fact is they’ve enriched uranium up to what 84% So my biggest concern is, if Iran goes nuclear, there’s no way you can control proliferation. Saudi Arabia goes nuclear quickly and Egypt and Turkey.
. I don’t think Israel alone can deter Iran that will be in the mind of these Arab nations. So to me, that is the most dangerous flashpoint in the world today. On proliferation is without a doubt, Iran, the second most is North Korea.
My worry is that how reckless would Kim be if the Chinese kind of wink wink told him We’re gonna go into Taiwan? We want you to mess with South Korea and keep the Americans busy. That to me is the worry because people say, Oh, he doesn’t want to see Pyongyang destroyed he doesn’t want to see millions of North Koreans die. And I asked you this. How many Chinese Russians, Soviet citizens North Koreans North Vietnamese, were killed by their own people in order to stay in power? Well, we know the number is 120
million people. And those are the people that killed of their own to say now these are the people who killed who they went to war with. So in my mind, Chris, how reckless and murderous are these people? Well, we know historically, these are not nice folks, and not nice regimes. So my worry is they could very well be willing to see a lot of their people die if it kept them in power. And that’s, that’s the challenge of deterrence of adequately deterring them, so they don’t decide to go to war, even if they lost millions of their own people.
Kris Osborn
On how to nuclear weapons, so much discussion about deterrence and proliferation and this question of arms reduction. What about those new way the Center for military modernization support the sad reality that nuclear weapons are necessary? But what about those who don’t think so we want to see the world disarm and that’s something you do here on the hill. So what’s your thought about that? And then from this whole conversation, what are a couple of quick thoughts on lessons learned and is there a prospect of full disarmament? Does that make any sense at all to anybody?
Peter Huessy
Well, Chris, Russia, China, North Korea, Pakistan, India, go ask them the same question. Are you willing to take your nuclear weapons down to zero? The overwhelming resounding question is, as Kim has supposedly said; “you first.”
Okay, so let’s understand up front and that’s arms control doesn’t solve these problems we face.
What are the things we’ve faced the new lessons of this nuclear age? The new paradigm:
Number one, if you don’t modernize, you’re out of the nuclear business. All your stuff is going to go away, because you can’t sustain it longer than about between sometime between 2030 and 2040. That’s Lesson number one. Number two, if the bad guys introduced nuclear weapons into a conventional fight, we lose they win. We have to change that formula and that deterrent reality number three sustainment and modernization are two parts of the same coin. But sustainment is two thirds of the money and modernization is a third. The sooner I get to modernization, the less money I’m going to spend. Right? I have to kind of think about the better I do modernization, the more money I’m going to save. And finally, deterrence is in the eye of the beholder, and the beholder gets to vote. So you can’t deter someone simply by saying, Boy, Id be deterred. I don’t want to see New York blown up. As I said, these people have killed 125 million of their own people to stay in power. Okay. I’m not talking about the Americans that were killed in the Korean War. I’m talking about the Koreans who were killed by the North Korean regime to stay in power. And China 65 million. Russia 40 million. How many people do you think they’re willing to risk to stay in power of their own people, let alone how many Americans? Okay, so deterrence is in the eye of the beholder. sustainment is more and more expensive. Therefore, modernization saves us money. Conventional insurance is not enough. Without modernization, you’re out of the nuclear business. And all of these must be kept in mind simultaneously.
Kris Osborn
Mr. Peter, who’s the professor I should say one of the leading experts in the country and nuclear weapons and determines policy sad but necessary to talk about these issues. Want to thank you for your time and expertise. We’ll have to do more again. To talk missile defense and hypersonics thank you so much, sir.
Peter Huessy
Thank you Kris Osborn, great work that you do on the Warrior Maven, take care.
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Kris Osborn is President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Maste
rs Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.
