By Peter Huessey, Warrior Senior Nuclear Weapons Analyst
The Washington Post recently noted that the world has a lot of arms but not much control. And surprisingly, the Post then went on to explain while the US has exercised restraint in its nuclear modernization—staying within the New START limits—not so Russia and China, with the result that an arms race is underway.
As retired Admiral Charles Richard noted in 2022 China is adding to its nuclear arsenal at a breathtaking speed. Russia has a significant upload capability in the multiple thousands of warheads, especially concerning given there have been no New START inspections for many years, on top of thousands of theater nuclear forces under no arms limits.
North Korea and Iran, one an expanding nuclear armed rogue state and the other on the nuclear doorstep, are allied with Russia and China, adding to nuclear dangers. Combined with its proxy terror groups such as the Houthis, Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran has shut down western allied freight traffic in the Red Sea and Suez, attacked US forces some 170 time in the region, and launched thousands of rockets and missiles at Israel and other allies of the US in the region. On top of which, Putin makes serial nuclear threats to Ukraine, while China says if Japan comes to the defense of Taiwan, it will suffer the same fate as the country did in WWII.
The Post was right to characterize the 2010 nuclear program of record as consistent with the New START treaty. But absent a new agreement by China and Russia to restrict arms, the US is indeed projected to face two nuclear armed peer adversaries for the first time, each with unrestrained nuclear arsenals.
What then are we meant to do? There are two approaches.
As the Posture Commission noted, the program of record is necessary, even critical, but not sufficient. The Senate Armed Service Committee calls for four new initiatives: (1) make all 76 B52s nuclear capable; (2) deploy Sentinel in all 450 silos; (3) establish a SLCM-N program office; and (4) create a high-level DoD official to oversee all nuclear programs. One could also reasonably add three additional Columbia submarines post 2042 as well as add warheads to the SLBM and ICBM legs of the Triad.
Now critics note that we should just improve our conventional capability. But as General Anthony Cotton has told Congress, if nuclear weapons are introduced into a conventional conflict, “nothing holds,” thus requiring for the USA to have both a conventional and nuclear deterrent second to none.
This is where Putin and Xi are making the world dangerous—as they are threatening the use of nuclear force as an adjunct to their conventional capability, using nuclear weapons not to deter conflict but to make it serve their purposes—getting the US and her allies to stand down in a conflict, what the Posture Commission described as nukes for bullying and coercion.
Chris Yeaw told us earlier Russia and China combined may have within the decade some 10,000 deployed nuclear weapons. Annie Jacobson says we need more negotiations and diplomacy—not more weapons. But she does not say what we are negotiating and where diplomacy will take us. She and others say make the US nuclear arsenal smaller—kill the ICBMs and make the US force with 70% fewer SNDVs and 25% fewer warheads, while eliminating any hedge to build beyond the current New Start warhead level.
This idea of killing our ICBM needs some examination. Some six arguments are common.
First, if we just removed the silo targets, the Russians wouldn’t be tempted to attack them. ICBM silos first, New York city next?
Second, ICBM s are apparently on a hair trigger although no President has ever called for their launch in the past 3.2 million minutes since the MMIII went on alert in Montana in October 1962. That is some “launch control.”
Third, for some reason the Russians are suicidal, and will launch nearly all their ICBM warheads—over 900—to take out 400 Minuteman ICBM silos and associated warheads and 45 launch control centers spread over 32,000 square miles over 5 states. While ignoring 350-400 sub warheads that could be deployed from Kings Bay and Bangor and 60 bombers from 3 bomber bases with anywhere between 600-1000 cruise missiles and gravity bombs available for retaliation. To say nothing, of the estimated 800 warheads at sea also available for retaliation.
Fourth, another charge is if the Russians launch their submarines at the ICBM silo, they secure a shorter flight time making it even more difficult for a President to launch our ICBMs back at Russia. But Moscow has around 500 submarine-based warheads in their entire fleet, not all of which are on alert. The force simply cannot hold at risk the entire US ICBM force.
Fifth, given the Russian missiles would have to either be launched at different times or would reach US soil at different times—either scenario would allow the US to launch after being attacked which would place Russia in nuclear jeopardy.
Sixth, critics often say the nuclear modernization effort is simply too expensive. But if you examine the defense budget, all modernization efforts within DOD—subs, sub missiles, ICBMs, bombes and NC3—come to $18 billion annually, which is 2% of the defense budget, and one third of all DOD-NNSA nuclear expenditures, including all sustainment and all modernization.
Another way to measure the cost is that over the 50 years of the ICBM force being deployed, it comes to an annual investment of $2.6 billion annually, compared to $128 billion annually for food stamps and the $76 billion annual Federal cost of caring for illegal aliens. As General Mattis has said, “the US can afford survival.”
To restore deterrence and prevent the world from spinning out of control, continuing the program of record and the newly recommended additional capabilities is the only choice we have unless again as Admiral Charles Richard explained, we wish to disarm and get out of the nuclear deterrent business. We can rust to obsolescence or modernize to deter. Those are our only two choices.
Your presence here and your support have helped America make the right choice.
