A quick look at force structures, basing and geography in the Pacific certainly seem to suggest that U.S. and allied Naval power would of course be crucial to stopping any kind of Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Although much is made of the fact that China now operates a larger Navy than the U.S., there are several key factors to consider.
The first and most obvious is certainly a question of timing and location. U.S. INDOPACIFIC Command operates as many as five aircraft carriers and more than 1,100 sea-launched aircraft. How fast can they respond? Will they be in position in time? This would hinge upon forward operations, overhead surveillance from drones and satellites and things like the U.S. Navy’s operating presence in the region.
There is likely a reason why the U.S. Navy and U.S. Pacific Fleet conducted dual-carrier operations in the Pacific theater, as an ability to potentially project dominant air power from closer-in ranges at sea could certainly be decisive.
Should an initial incoming salvo of ballistic missiles be blunted or stopped by Taiwanese air defenses, radar systems and interceptors such as Patriot missile batteries, then air and sea-launched Air Forces might have time to stop a Chinese amphibious assault, provided carriers were close enough.
Speed would be the deciding factor, it seems clear, given that Taiwan is only 100 miles from the Chinese coast. Chinese Naval forces, however, would need to be staged, prepared and assembled prior to any attack, something easily noticeable by U.S. and allied sensors, satellites, surveillance drones and other sources. This might give U.S. and allied forces an opportunity to “race” counterattack forces into position.