By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization
Perhaps an America-class amphibious assault ship in the Pacific launches an F-35B over coastal island areas in the South China Sea .. the F-35 controls “wingman” drones able to conduct high-risk forward surveillance over armed, high-threat enemy areas and targeting specifics are sent to drones with software programmable radios from ground jungles on islands, enabling nearby US Navy warships to fire over-the-horizon missiles at moving ground and surface targets from hundreds of miles away.
These kinds of scenarios are precisely what an advanced US Army-led Joint, International “Pacific Winds” Wargame explored in depth during its United Pacific Wargame Series 2023. The in depth analysis, which included computer simulations, combat scenarios and extensive assessments of networking and data processing technologies, was an intelligence-focused exercise to analyze critical developments, tactics and technologies “prior” to the start of full combat. The phase of war is of course critical as it is where ISR, threat detection, information processing and targeting accuracy determine subsequent outcomes.
“Seeing” Chinese Attacks Before They Happen
The wargame is described in an Army essay as providing “Intelligence Support to Indication and Warnings (I&W) and Joint Targeting.” For instance, should China contemplate a surprise air, ballistic missile or amphibious assault on Taiwan, early surveillance of launched weapons, force formations or fighter jet proximity could all potentially be identified “prior” to combat by satellites, drones, ground sensors, surface ships and air platforms …. giving war commanders an improved time window within which to determine an optimal counterattack or defensive strategy.
“The PRC is only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it,” America’s Theater Army for the Indo-Pacific states, quoting the 2022 National Security Strategy.
The Unified Pacific 2023 Wargame was intended to extend and build upon key findings from 2022’s exercise which, among other things, identified a number of Chinese advantages in the Pacific.
“The People’s Republic of China holds advantages of mass, munitions depth and interior lines—operating from a central position that enables an army to move faster than opposing forces can counter—that will take the entire joint force to deny its military objectives,” Army Pacific Commander Gen. Charles Flynn writes in an April edition of AUSA Magazine.
Unified Pacific 2023, which took place in January 2023, sought to build upon these 2022 finding in a substantial way by exploring “indications & Warnings, Joint Targeting” and theater sustainment.
Wargame & FVEY – International Intelligence Alliance
The wargame also included participation from the lesser known but impactful Five Eyes international intelligence alliance linking the US with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK for the purpose of refining both multi-domain and multi-national operational effectiveness and networking.
Naturally the findings from such an elaborate enterprise are likely to be quite nuanced, varied and full of complexities, yet a published Army Pacific Unclassified essay on the wargames does specify several critical findings in a general way. Many of the exercises’ findings are not likely to be public for security reasons, yet Army Pacific’s published wargame findings point out that of course the speed and accuracy of information gathering, processing and transmission can expedite decision-making. Yet within this broader more well known concept, something the report identifies as “intuitive,” there were several specific variables of great consequence cited in the findings. They pertain to the need to operate a wide-sphere of multi-domain sensors, built-in redundancy and accurate, high-speed data processing, called PED. (Processing Exploitation and Dissemination)
“While that is intuitive,it was the variety of sensors that provided additional information, capable of recognizing changes in the operational environment. In a contested environment, There must be robust, consistent, and diverse collection capability in the region…… redundant capability gained through a mix of sensors, is vital to providing I&W (Indication & Warnings) to enable senior leader decision making,” the Army Pacific report, called “United Pacific Wargame Series 2023,” writes.
The reference to a “mix” of sensors seems critical here, as does the mention of redundancy, as they are interwoven. The text of the Army Pacific report refers to this is Persistent, Diversified Collection.
Land-based or what the report calls “terrestrial” sensors are increasingly critical to fortify, anchor and supplement air and surface nodes, and a variety of different sensing modes, technologies and transport layers can ensure “redundancy,” meaning continued operational functionality in the event that one mode of transmission is destroyed, crippled or disabled.
One key example of a system such as this can be seen in the Army’s now operational Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS), a networked system of radar and sensor nodes able to synchronize and transmit target track data across ground-air-and-surface nodes. IBCS can now connect a ground-based Patriot radar system with a Sentinel Radar, ground command and control center and airnode surveillance assets such as an F-35 or satellite in space. IBCS is and has been entirely multi-domain, yet grounded in the critical elements provided by terrestrial sensors, something emphasized in the Army Pacific report on the wargames. The system, which has been evolving for years, amounts to a critical portion of the Army’s contribution to the Pentagon’s Joint All Domain Command and Control effort to connect all the domains and service in a similar fashion. There is even exploration of extending IBCS’ reach to the sea and connecting it to Aegis radar so surface warships can collaboratively share threat track information across domains as well.
PED – Processing, Exploitation & Dissemination
Drones over the ocean collect hours of video data, ground sensors receive massive volumes of threat data, satellites detect climate fluctuations and map uneven terrain for targeting and combat platforms gather, process and transmit time critical targeting and threat information across multiple domains.
Breakthrough technology now enables this to take place at an unprecedented scale and speed, fortified by high-speed, AI-empowered computing, integrated transport layer communication systems and data processing at the point of collection.
These variables will likely decide which force prevails in war, as the force which sees, detects, processes information and targets enemies faster and with greater precision will be positioned to prevail.
Among the wargames key findings: Vast, massive amounts of gathered sensor data accomplishes little without PED.
“Unprocessed intelligence produced by all platforms and initiatives must be PED effectively, and distributed to those that require the information. Without simultaneous improvements in the capacity and capability of PED systems, parallel improvements in collection will fail to achieve desired results.” the Army Pacific text states.
In operational terms, what this means is that in a possible combat scenario, some incoming data may arrive from GPS satellite signals, other data from EO
/IR or RF signals while additional critical information arrives through optical sensors, millimeter wave sensing or other wireless signals. How can data from these otherwise disparate methods of collection be integrated, processed and analyzed in relation to one another? AI-enabled computing and certain kinds of so-called “gateway” technologies now enable this to a much greater extent.
Emerging technologies, including AI-enabled computer processing and “gateways” capable of using common standards and computer algorithms to create “interfaces” to connect otherwise disparate transport layers of communication, now enable a host of dispersed, multi-domain war platforms to function as weapons and attack mechanisms as well as sensor “nodes” within a vast, meshed networking system. Navy destroyers, 5th-generation air assets, armored ground vehicles, satellites and even submarines are all increasingly able to gather, collect and share time-sensitive combat information across seemingly incompatible domains and asynchronous or disconnected transport layers.
Yet another principle advantage of improving PED pertains to a question of scale, meaning an ability to locate, organize and transmit massive amounts of seemingly limitless information into useable, integrated, accurate and quickly transmittable forms of information. Scaling can also help “layer” or compartmentalize information to improve efficiency, increase information assurance and enable networking and data processing at the tip-of-the-spear or point of collection at what Commanders call the “speed of relevance.”
These concepts of operation are not lost on weapons developers and futurists at the Pentagon, who increasingly emphasize that major combat systems operate as sensor “nodes” as well as attack systems. The B-21 will be a stealth bomber attack platform, yet it will also gather, organize, analyze and transmit time sensitive combat intelligence across multiple domains in real time operating in dispersed, disaggregated formations. Navy Flight III DDG 51 Destroyers will not only launch Tomahawks and fly drones in maritime combat but also utilize Aegis Combat Systems to function as a multi-domain sensor “node” using highly-sensitive SPY-6 radar to detect ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons or even ICBMs. The intent is for this identified threat track data to integrate across land, sea, air and space domains in milliseconds … the data-centric vision and reality of AI-enabled modern warfare. Alongside the use stealth bombers and surface warships, multi-domain PED will also include fighter jets, unmanned systems of all shapes and sizes and a wide sphere of ground forces to include tanks increasingly capable of gathering processing and sharing high-value target detail at long ranges across domains.
All of these factors likely explain why the Army Pacific report refers to a Pacific PED Center for Joint Processing Exploitation and Dissemination support.
Kris Osborn is President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.