By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization
US Navy surface ships have eliminated most if not all Houthi missile and drone attacks in the Red Sea, a reality which suggests layered ship defenses are reaching breakthrough levels of maturity and technological advances.
US Navy destroyer-fired guns, interceptors and perhaps other countermeasures have consistently proven successful against what has become a series of ongoing “routine” attacks on US and commercial vessels operating in the Red Sea. Carrier launched F/A-18s may have also provided defensive counterfire, according to Central Command in some instances, however the majority of the defenses appear to have come from US Navy surface warships on patrol in the Red Sea.
While drone attacks, missiles and even drone swarms have proven easy to defend thus far … what about explosive-packed unmanned attack surface drones? The Houthis are now detonating unmanned surface vessels in international shipping lanes, a method of attack which could introduce new complications for ship defenses.
“A Houthi one-way attack unmanned surface vessel, or USV, detonated in international shipping lanes. Fortunately, there were no casualties and no ships were hit, but the introduction of a one-way attack USV is of concern,” Navy Vice. Adm. Brad Cooper, Commander, United States Naval Forces Central Command, said recently according to a transcript from NAVCENT, Naval Forces Central Command.
This is a new threat presented by the Houthis, and it makes sense given that air-fired missiles and drones have proven ineffectual. The steady series of successful intercepts suggest US Navy ship defenses are fortified by accurate and timely surveillance and intelligence information regarding the launch, trajectory and location of attack air threats such as missiles and drones. However, what about surface attack drones? The US Navy has already shown it can use guns, interceptors and even helicopters to destroy attacking swarms of manned small boats, but what about unmanned drone attack boats?
Houthi Drone Boat Risk
Should an enemy drone be seen from sufficient stand-off distance, then destroying it from the air or ship-deck before it moves within attack range of a surface ship seems quite manageable. However, what about a small swarm of drone boats armed with explosives and directed to collide with a US Navy surface warship? Unlike manned small boats which were quickly destroyed from the air, as there were only four in a previous Houthi attack, unmanned attack boats might be able to approach in much larger numbers across disaggregated formations. This is the intent of any kind of small boat attack, as the concept is to crowd, blanket or simply overwhelm ship defenses by attacking from multiple angles at once from fast-strike positions. Deck-mounted guns can only shoot in one general direction at a time, so the idea with a surface drone swarm attack or manned small boat offensive would be to simultaneously strike a surface ship from multiple angles. It is certainly “conceivable” that the Houthis may have an ability to launch a small swarm of attack drone boats, a threat possibility which introduces a number of relevant variables.
The failure rate of Houthi drone and missile attacks indicates the maturity of US Navy ship defenses and also seems to suggest that perhaps the Houthis lack sophisticated guidance and targeting technologies. This would seem the case, because while Navy ships are capable of tracking and destroying precision-guided incoming missiles, CentCom reports of the attacks have been clear that, in many cases, it has been difficult to discern the intended target of some of the Houthi attacks. This would suggest that they are not likely to operate with precision-guidance systems in any substantial way, as a guided projectile can offer evidence of its destination or intended target to a degree by virtue of its trajectory or demonstrated ability to maneuver.
Upgraded CIWS 1B variant
The Houthis may not have swarms of drone boats and, perhaps of even greater significance, may lack the technological sophistication to guide them or perform the necessary command and control. Should they be seen from a workable stand-off distance, US Navy ship commanders would likely have an ability to launch helicopters and medium-to-long-range ship-fired interceptor missiles such as SeaRAM or Rolling AirFrame Missiles. The optimal or perhaps most promising defense against swarms of attacking drone boats could arguably be found in advancements made to the Navy’s Close-In-Weapons-System (CIWS). CIWS is a Phalanx area defense weapon which fires hundreds of small steel interceptors across an area to provide a blanket of protection or defensive fire.
Historically, CIWS was conceived of and used for air defense, yet roughly ten years ago the Navy implemented a series of extensive upgrades to CIWS, engineering new variants with improved targets envelopes. For example, instead of blanketing an area in the air above a ship to stop or intercept attacking drones, missiles and even helicopters, the Navy developed a CIWS 1B variant designed to blanket the surface of the ocean surrounding a warship. CIWS’ range can be quite significant as it fires hundreds of mini projectiles per minute which can travel miles away from the attacked ship. A CIWS variant able to track and defend against surface drone boat attacks, would therefore potentially prove extremely critical in the event a warship were attacked by a surface fleet of armed unmanned drones.
Kris Osborn is the President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization and the Defense Editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.
