Could the US Stop a Massive, Sudden “Fait Accompli” Chinese Takeover of Taiwan?

By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization

The Pentagon’s China reports refer to it as a “fait accompli,” ….. a sudden, massive, catastrophic Chinese ballistic missile attack on Taiwan designed to overwhelm its air defenses, destroy its aircraft and quickly encircle or occupy the island with an amphibious assault.

The potential Chinese thinking, according to Pentagon strategists tracking the Chinese threat, would be to annex Taiwan quickly such that it would become too costly in terms of casualties, war damage and dollars to assemble a force capable of “extricating” an occupying Chinese force from Taiwan. 

Looking at available force numbers across the Pacific from countries such as South Korea and Japan, and the number of available 5th-generation aircraft and US Navy assets, it does seem realistic that a US allied force might be able to “remove” or destroy PLA forces occupying Taiwan, yet the question is “at what cost?” Including reserves, Globalfirepower.com’s 2023 force assessments says Japan can mass as many as 1 million forces and South Korea has at least 2 million in manpower. However, what would it take to assemble, stage and launch a multi-national amphibious attack force capable of removing a Chinese force embedded in Taiwan? Getting heavy armor or mechanized formations to the island of Taiwan would also likely prove quite difficult or time consuming.  Naval superiority and 5th-generation air attack, coupled with long-range surface and air land strike would seem critical to any effort of this kind. Air superiority would likely be the fastest and most expedient path through which to destroy a Chinese force occupying Taiwan. 

Ultimately, the operative question is …. would China take a chance on the possibility that the US and its allies would simply let a “fait accompli” Chinese takeover of Taiwan stand?

This is a complicated question with a number of military and political variables, yet somewhat less complicated yet equally if not more dangerous is the threat of a high-speed, unexpected Chinese ballistic missile takeover of Taiwan. Although Taiwan is only 100 miles from the Chinese mainland, any kind of assembling or preparing amphibious attack force would be noticed by US and allied drones and satellites, offering a brief window through which to respond. Should there be sufficient stealthy, heavily armed attack submarines and forward-positioned US Navy 5th-generation sea launched aircraft, then a Chinese amphibious attack could very well be destroyed from the air and undersea before reaching Taiwanese shores.

However, an unexpected, rapid, massive salvo of ballistic missiles would be an entirely different scenario, especially if hypersonics were involved. Being just 100 miles away from Taiwan, Chinese mainland forces could launch a massive, high-speed ballistic missile attack with the hope of crippling Taiwan faster than any defenders could respond. Even if launches were detected by US and allied satellites and sensors, would there be enough interceptors and missile defenses in place and capable of blunting, slowing or stopping a massive salvo of Chinese missiles targeted at Taiwan’s air defenses, land forces and air assets. Obviously any kind of credible early intelligence would be critical here, because any ability to stop a Chinese “salvo” would rely on how soon or quickly US and allied defenders would know about it. 

A cutting edge research effort by Rand and the Special Competitive Studies Project took up this question of defending Taiwan in an elaborate, next-generation wargame aimed at assessing a US, Taiwanese or allied effort to stop a rapid Chinese take-over of Taiwan. Interestingly, RAND military experts worked in close coordination with private sector IT and silicon valley technologists to explore solutions to a potential Chinese invasion. The wargame assessment, as articulated in an essay from the report’s authors in Breaking Defense, did indeed reveal the serious difficulties which would be associated with any effort to stop a massive ballistic missile attack.